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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a user-centric privacy framework for quan-
titatively assessing the exposure of personal information in open settings.
Our formalization addresses key-challenges posed by such open settings,
such as the unstructured dissemination of heterogeneous information and
the necessity of user- and context-dependent privacy requirements. We
propose a new definition of information sensitivity derived from our for-
malization of privacy requirements, and, as a sanity check, show that hard
non-disclosure guarantees are impossible to achieve in open settings.
After that, we provide an instantiation of our framework to address the
identity disclosure problem, leading to the novel notion of d-convergence.
d-convergence is based on indistinguishability of entities and it bounds
the likelihood with which an adversary successfully links two profiles of
the same user across online communities.
Finally, we provide a large-scale evaluation of our framework on a
collection of 15 million comments collected from the Online Social Network
Reddit. Our evaluation validates the notion of d-convergence for assessing
the linkability of entities in our data set and provides deeper insights into
the data set’s structure.
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1 Introduction
The Internet has undergone dramatic changes in the last two decades, evolving
from a mere communication network to a global multimedia platform in which
billions of users not only actively exchange information, but increasingly con-
duct sizable parts of their daily lives. While this transformation has brought
tremendous benefits to society, it has also created new threats to online pri-
vacy that existing technology is failing to keep pace with. Users tend to reveal
personal information without considering the widespread, easy accessibility, po-
tential linkage and permanent nature of online data. Many cases reported in
the press show the resulting risks, which range from public embarrassment and
loss of prospective opportunities (e.g., when applying for jobs or insurance),
to personal safety and property risks (e.g., when sexual offenders or burglars
learn users’ whereabouts online). The resulting privacy awareness and privacy
concerns of Internet users have been further amplified by the advent of the Big-
Data paradigm and the aligned business models of personalized tracking and
monetizing personal information in an unprecedented manner.
Developing a suitable methodology to reason about the privacy of users in
such a large-scale, open web setting, as well as corresponding tool support in
the next step, requires at its core a formal privacy model that lives up to the
now increasingly dynamic dissemination of unstructured, heterogeneous user
content on the Internet: While users traditionally shared information mostly
using public profiles with static information about themselves, nowadays they
disseminate personal information in an unstructured, highly dynamic manner,
through content they create and share (such as blog entries, user comments,
a “Like” on Facebook), or through the people they befriend or follow. Fur-
thermore, ubiquitously available background knowledge about a dedicated user
needs to be appropriately reflected within the model and its reasoning tasks, as
it can decrease a user’s privacy by inferring further sensitive information. As an
example, Machine Learning and other Information Retrieval techniques provide
comprehensive approaches for profiling a user’s actions across multiple Online
Social Networks, up to a unique identification of a given user’s profiles for each
such network.
Prior research on privacy has traditionally focused on closed database set-
tings – characterized by a complete view on structured data and a clear dis-
tinction of key- and sensitive attributes – and has aimed for strong privacy
guarantees using global data sanitization. These approaches, however, are in-
herently inadequate if such closed settings are replaced by open settings as
described above, where unstructured and heterogeneous data is being dissemi-
nated, where individuals have a partial view of the available information, and
where global data sanitization is impossible and hence strong guarantees have
to be replaced by probabilistic privacy assessments.
As of now, even the basic methodology is missing for offering users technical
means to comprehensively assess the privacy risks incurred by their data dis-
semination, and their daily online activities in general. Existing privacy models
such as k-anonymity [30], l-diversity [22], t-closeness [21] and the currently most
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popular notion of Differential Privacy [11] follow a database-centric approach
that is inadequate to meet the requirements outlined above. We refer the reader
to Section 3.3 for further discussions on existing privacy models.
1.1 Contribution
In this paper, we present a rigorous methodology for quantitatively assessing
the exposure of personal information in open settings. Concretely, the paper
makes the following three tangible contributions: (1) a formal framework for
reasoning about the disclosure of personal information in open settings, (2)
an instantiation of the framework for reasoning about the identity disclosure
problem, and (3) an evaluation of the framework on a collection of 15 million
comments collected from the Online Social Network Reddit.
A Formal Framework for Privacy in Open Settings. We propose a novel frame-
work for addressing the essential challenges of privacy in open settings, such as
providing a data model that is suited for dealing with unstructured dissemina-
tion of heterogeneous information through various different sources and a flexible
definition of user-specific privacy requirements that allow for the specification
of context-dependent privacy goals. In contrast to most existing approaches,
our framework strives to assess the degree of exposure individuals face, in con-
trast to trying to enforce an individual’s privacy requirements. Moreover, our
framework technically does not differentiate between non-sensitive and sensitive
attributes a-priori, but rather starts from the assumption that all data is equally
important and can lead to privacy risks. More specifically, our model captures
the fact that the sensitivity of attributes is highly user- and context-dependent
by deriving information sensitivity from each user’s privacy requirements. As a
sanity check we prove that hard non-disclosure guarantees cannot be provided
for the open setting in general, providing incentive for novel approaches for
assessing privacy risks in the open settings.
Reasoning about Identity Disclosure in Open Settings. We then instantiate our
general privacy framework for the specific use case of identity disclosure. Our
framework defines and assesses identity disclosure (i.e., identifiability and link-
ability of identities) by utilizing entity similarity, i.e., an entity is private in a
collection of entities if it is sufficiently similar to its peers. At the technical core
of our model is the new notion of d-convergence, which quantifies the similarity
of entities within a larger group of entities. It hence provides the formal grounds
to assess the ability of any single entity to blend into the crowd, i.e., to hide
amongst peers. The d-convergence model is furthermore capable of assessing
identity disclosure risks specifically for single entities. To this end, we extend
the notion of d-convergence to the novel notion of (k, d)-anonymity, which allows
for entity-centric identity disclosure risk assessments by requiring d-convergence
in the local neighborhood of a given entity. Intuitively, this new notion provides
a generalization of k-anonymity that is not bound to matching identities based
on pre-defined key-identifiers.
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Empirical Evaluation on Reddit. Third, we perform an instantiation of our
identity disclosure model for the important use case of analyzing user-generated
text content in order to characterize specific user profiles. We use unigram
frequencies extracted from user-generated content as user attributes, and we
subsequently demonstrate that the resulting unigram model can indeed be used
for quantifying the degree of anonymity of – and ultimately, for differentiating
– individual entities. For the sake of exposition, we apply this unigram model
to a collection of 15 million comments collected from the Online Social Network
Reddit. The computations were performed on two Dell PowerEdge R820 with 64
virtual cores each at 2.60GHz over the course of six weeks. Our evaluation shows
that (k, d)-anonymity suitably assesses an identity’s anonymity and provides
deeper insights into the data set’s structure.
1.2 Outline
We begin by discussing related work in Section 2 and explain why existing
privacy notions are inadequate for reasoning about privacy in open web settings
in Section 3. We then define our privacy framework in Section 4 and instantiate
it for reasoning about identity disclosure in Section 5. In Section 6 we perform
a basic evaluation of the identity disclosure model on the Reddit Online Social
Network. We summarize our findings 7.
2 Related Work
In this section, we give an overview over other relevant related work that has
not yet been considered in the previous subsection.
Privacy in Closed-world Settings. The notion of privacy has been ex-
haustively discussed for specific settings such as statistical databases, as well
as for more general settings. Since we already discussed the notions of k-
anonymity [30], l-diversity [22] t-closeness [21] and Differential Privacy [11] in
Section 3.3 in great detail, we will now discuss further such notions.
A major point of criticism of Differential Privacy, but also the other exist-
ing privacy notions, found in the literature [18] is the (often unclear) trade-off
between utility and privacy that is incurred by applying database sanitation
techniques to achieve privacy. Several works have shown that protection against
attribute disclosure cannot be provided in settings that consider an adversary
with arbitrary auxiliary information [10, 12, 13]. We later show, as sanity check,
that in our formalization of privacy in open settings, general non-disclosure
guarantees are indeed impossible to achieve. By providing the necessary formal
groundwork in this paper, we hope to stimulate research on assessing privacy
risks in open settings, against explicitly spelled-out adversary models.
Kasiviswanathan and Smith [17] define the notion of -semantic privacy to
capture general non-disclosure guarantees. We define our adversary model in a
similar fashion as in their formalization and we use -semantic privacy to show
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that general non-disclosure guarantees cannot be meaningfully provided in open
settings.
Several extensions of the above privacy notions have been proposed in the
literature to provide privacy guarantees in use cases that differ from traditional
database privacy [3, 6, 34, 16, 36, 7]. These works aim at suitably transforming
different settings into a database-like setting that can be analyzed using differ-
ential privacy. Such a transformation, however, often abstracts away from es-
sential components of these settings, and as a result achieve impractical privacy
guarantees. As explained in Section 3.3, the open web setting is particularly
ill-suited for such transformations.
Specifically for the use case in Online Social Networks (in short, OSNs),
many works [34, 19, 16, 36, 7] apply the existing database privacy notions for
reasoning about attribute disclosure in OSN data. These works generally im-
pose a specific structure on OSN data, such as a social link graph, and reason
about the disclosure of private attributes through this structure. Zhaleva et
al. [34] show that mixed public and private profiles do not necessarily protect
the private part of a profile since they can be inferred from the public part.
Heatherly et al. [16] show how machine learning techniques can be used to in-
fer private information from publicly available information. Kosinksi et al. [19]
moreover show that machine learning techniques can indeed be used to predict
personality traits of users and their online behavior. Zhou et al. [36] apply the
notions of k-anonymity and l-diversity to data protection in OSNs and discuss
the complexity of finding private subsets. Their approach does however suffer
from the same problems these techniques have in traditional statistical data
disclosure, where an adversary with auxiliary information can easily infer infor-
mation about any specific user. Chen et al. [7] provide a variation of differential
privacy which allows for privacy and protection against edge-disclosure attacks
in the correlated setting of OSNs. The setting, however, remains static, and it
is assumed that the data can be globally sanitized in order to provide protec-
tion against attribute disclosure. Again, as discussed in Section 3.3, this does
not apply to the open web setting with its highly unstructured dissemination of
data.
Statistical Language Models. Statistical Language Models for information
retrieval have first been introduced by Ponte and Croft [26] as an alternative
approach for document retrieval and are inspired by language models for Speech
Recognition and Natural Language Processing [29, 27]. They have subsequently
been focus of a long line of research (examples include [20, 33, 31, 32]) that
further develop the basic statistical language model approach and its benefits.
While Statistical Language Models have not been shown to perform better than
other established retrieval methods [32], we found that the Statistical Language
Model formulation is closer than other options to what we require in expressing
and solving indistinguishability problems that arise in computer security.
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3 Privacy in Open Settings
Before we delve into the technical parts of this paper, we give an informal
overview over privacy in the Internet of the future. To this end, we first provide
an example that illustrates some of the aspects of privacy in the Internet, and
then in detail discuss the challenges of privacy in the Internet and why existing
privacy notions are not applicable to this setting.
3.1 Example
Consider the following example: Employer Alice receives an application by po-
tential employee Bob which contains personal information about Bob. Before
she makes the decision on the employment of Bob, however, she searches the
¡internet and tries to learn even more about her potential employee. A prime
source of information are, for example, Online Social Networks (OSNs) which
Alice can browse through. If she manages to identify Bob’s profile in such an
OSN she can then learn more about Bob by examining the publicly available
information of this profile.
In order to correctly identify Bob’s profile in an OSN, Alice takes the fol-
lowing approach: based on the information found in Bob’s application, she
constructs a model θB that contains all attributes, such as name, education or
job history, extracted from Bob’s application. She then compares this model
θB to the profiles P1, . . . , Pn found in the OSNs and ranks them by similarity
to the model θB . Profiles that show sufficient similarity to the model θB are
then chosen by Alice as belonging to Bob. After identifying the (for Alice) cor-
rectly matching profiles P ∗1 , . . . , P
∗
i of Bob, Alice can finally merge their models
θ∗1 , . . . , θ
∗
i with θB to increase her knowledge about Bob.
Bob now faces the problem that Alice could learn information about him
that he does not want her to learn. He basically has two options: he either
does not share this critical information at all, or makes sure that his profile is
not identifiable as his. In OSNs such as Facebook, where users are required
to identify themselves, Bob can only use the first option. In anonymous or
pseudonymous OSNs such as Reddit or Twitter, however, he can make use of
the second option. He then has to make sure that he does not share enough
information on his pseudonymous profiles that would allow Alice to link his
pseudonymous profile to him personally.
Privacy in the open web is mostly concerned with the second option: we
cannot protect an entity  against sharing personal information through a profile
which is already uniquely identified with the entity . We can, however, estimate
how well an pseudonymous account of  can be linked to , and through this
link, learn personal information about . As the example above shows, we can
essentially measure privacy in terms of similarity of an entity  in a collection
of entities E .
The identifiability of  then substantially depends on the attributes  exhibits
in the context of E and does not necessarily follow the concept of personally iden-
tifiable information (PII) as known in the more common understanding of pri-
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vacy and in privacy and data-protection legislation [2]: here, privacy protection
only goes as far as protecting this so-called personally identifiable information,
which often is either not exactly defined, or restricted to an a-priori-defined set
of attributes such as name, Social Security number, etc. We, along with other
authors in the literature [25, 24], find however that the set of critical attributes
that need to be protected differ from entity to entity, and from community to
community. For example, in a community in which all entities have the name
“Bob”, exposing your name does not expose any information about yourself. In
a different community, however, where everyone has a different name, exposing
your name exposes a lot of information about yourself.
In terms of the privacy taxonomy formulated by Zheleva and Getoor [35],
the problem we face corresponds to the identity disclosure problem, where one
tries to identify whether and how an identity is represented in an OSN. We
think that this is one of the main concerns of users of frequently used OSNs,
in particular those that allow for pseudonymous interactions: users are able to
freely express their opinions in these environments, assuming that their opinions
cannot be connected to their real identity. However, any piece of information
they share in their interactions can leak personal information that can lead to
identity disclosure, defeating the purpose of such pseudonymous services.
To successfully reason about the potential disclosure of sensitive information
in such open settings, we first have to consider various challenges that have not
been considered in traditional privacy research. After presenting these chal-
lenges, we discuss the implications of these challenges on some of the existing
privacy notions, before we consider other relevant related work in the field.
3.2 Challenges of Privacy in Open Settings
In this subsection, we introduce the challenges induced by talking about privacy
in open settings:
C1) Modeling heterogeneous information. We require an information model
that allows for modeling various types of information and that reflects the het-
erogeneous information shared throughout the Internet. This models needs to
adequately represent personal information that can be inferred from various
sources, such as static profile information or from user-generated content, and
should allow statistical assessments about the user, as is usually provided by
knowledge inference engines. We propose a solution to this challenge in Sec-
tion 4.1.
C2) User-specified privacy requirements. We have to be able to formalize user-
specified privacy requirements. This formalization should use the previously
mentioned information model to be able to cope with heterogeneous informa-
tion, and specify which information should be protected from being publicly
disseminated. We present a formalization of user privacy requirements in Sec-
tion 4.4.
C3) Information sensitivity. In open settings, information sensitivity is is a
function of user expectations and context: we therefore need to provide new
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definitions for sensitive information that takes user privacy requirements into
account. We present context- and user-specific definitions of information sensi-
tivity in Section 4.5.
C4) Adversarial knowledge estimation. To adequately reason about disclosure
risks in open settings we also require a parameterized adversary model that we
can instantiate with various assumptions on the adversary’s knowledge: this
knowledge should include the information disseminated by the user, as well
as background knowledge to infer additional information about the user. In
Section 4, we define our adversary model based on statistical inference.
In the following sections, we provide a rigorous formalization for these re-
quirements, leading to a formal framework for privacy in open settings. We will
instantiate this framework in Section 5.3 to reason about the identity disclosure
in particular.
We begin by discussing why existing privacy notions are not suited for rea-
soning about privacy in open settings. Afterwards, we provide an overview over
further related work.
3.3 Inadequacy of Existing Models
Common existing privacy notions such as k-anonymity [30], l-diversity [22], t-
closeness [21] and the currently most popular notion of Differential Privacy [11]
provide the technical means for privacy-friendly data-publishing in a closed-
world setting: They target scenarios in which all data is available from the
beginning, from a single data source, remains static and is globally sanitized
in order to provide rigorous privacy guarantees. In what follows, we describe
how these notions fail to adequately address the challenges of privacy in open
settings discussed above.
a) Absence of structure and classification of data. All the aforementioned pri-
vacy models require an a-priori structure and classification of the data under
consideration. Any information gathered about an individual thus has to be
embedded in this structure, or it cannot be seamlessly integrated in these mod-
els.
b) No differentiation of attributes. All of these models except for Differential
Privacy require an additional differentiation between key attributes that identify
an individual record, and sensitive attributes that a users seeks to protect. This
again contradicts the absence of an a-priori, static structure in our setting.
Moreover, as pointed out above and in the literature [25], such a differentiation
cannot be made a-priori in general, and it would be highly context-sensitive in
the open web setting.
c) Ubiquitously available background knowledge. All of these models, except for
Differential Privacy, do not take into account adversaries that utilize ubiqui-
tously available background knowledge about a target user to infer additional
sensitive information. A common example of background knowledge is openly
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available statistical information that allows the adversary to infer additional
information about an identity.
d) Privacy for individual users. All these models provide privacy for the whole
dataset, which clearly implies privacy of every single user. One of the major
challenges in open settings such as the Internet, however, is that accessing and
sanitizing all available data is impossible. This leads to the requirement to
design a local privacy notion that provides a lower privacy bound for every
individual user, even if we only have partial access to the available data.
The notion of Differential Privacy only fails to address some of the aforemen-
tioned requirements (parts a and d), but it comes with the additional assump-
tion that the adversary knows almost everything about the data set in question
(everything except for the information in one database entry). This assump-
tion enables Differential Privacy to avoid differentiation between key attributes
and sensitive attributes. This strong adversarial model, however, implies that
privacy guarantees are only achievable if the considered data is globally per-
turbed [10, 12, 13], which is not possible in open web settings.
The conceptual reason for the inadequacy of existing models for reasoning
about privacy in open web settings is mostly their design goal: Privacy models
have thus far mainly been concerned with the problem of attribute disclosure
within a single data source: protection against identity disclosure was then
attempted by preventing the disclosure of any (sensitive) attributes of a user to
the public. In contrast to static settings such as private data publishing, where
we can decide which information will be disclosed to the adversary, protection
against any attribute disclosure in open settings creates a very different set of
challenges which we will address in the following sections.
4 A Framework for Privacy in Open Settings
In this section, we first develop a user model that is suited for dealing with
the information dissemination behavior commonly observed on the Internet.
We then formalize our adversary model and show, as a sanity check, that hard
privacy guarantees cannot be achieved in open settings. We conclude by defining
privacy goals in open settings through user-specified privacy requirements from
which we then derive a new definition of information sensitivity suited to open
settings.
4.1 Modeling Information in Open Settings
We first define the notion of entity models and restricted entity models. These
models capture the behavior of these entities and in particular describe which
attributes an entity exhibits publicly.
Definition 1 (Entity Model). Let A be the set of all attributes. The entity
model θ of an entity  provides for all attributes α ∈ A an attribute value
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θ(α) ∈ dom(α)∪ {NULL} where dom(α) is the domain over which the attribute
αi is defined.
The domain dom(θ) of an entity model θ is the set of all attributes α ∈ A
with value θ(α) 6= NULL.
An entity model thus corresponds to the information an entity can publicly
disseminate. With the specific null value NULL we can also capture those cases
where the entity does not have any value for that specific attribute.
In case the adversary has access to the full entity model, a set of entity
models basically corresponds to a database with each attribute α ∈ A as its
columns. In the open setting, however, an entity typically does not disseminate
all attribute values, but instead only a small part of them. We capture this with
the notion of restricted entity models.
Definition 2 (Restricted Entity Model). The restricted entity model θA
′
 is the
entity model of  restricted to the non empty attribute set A′ 6= ∅, i.e.,
θA
′
 (α) =
{
θ(α), if α ∈ A′
NULL, otherwise
In the online setting, each of the entities above corresponds to an online
profile. A user u usually uses more than one online service, each with different
profiles Pu1 , . . . , P
u
l . We thus define a user model as the collection of the entity
models describing each of these profiles.
Definition 3 (User Model / Profile Model). The user model
θu = {θPu1 ,, . . . , θPu1 } of a user u is a set of the entity models θPu1 ,, . . . , θPu1 ,,
which we also call profile models.
With a user model that separates the information disseminated under differ-
ent profiles, we will be able to formulate privacy requirements for each of these
profiles separately. We will investigate this in Section 4.4.
4.2 Adversary Model
In the following we formalize the adversary we consider for privacy in open
settings. In our formalization, we follow the definitions of a semantic, Bayesian
adversary introduced by Kasiviswanathan and Smith [17].
For any profile P , we are interested in what the adversary Adv learns about
P observing publicly available information from P . We formalize this learning
process through beliefs on the models of each profile.
Definition 4 (Belief). Let P be the set of all profiles and let DA be the set
of all distributions over profile models. A belief b = {bP |P ∈ P} is a set of
distributions bP ∈ DA.
We can now define our privacy adversary in open settings using the notion
of belief above.
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Definition 5 (Adversary). An adversary Adv is a pair of prior belief b and
world knowledge κ, i.e., Adv = (b, κ).
The adversary Adv’s prior belief b represents his belief in each profile’s profile
model before makes any observations. This prior belief can, in particular, also
include background knowledge about each profile P . The world knowledge κ of
the adversary represents a set of inference rules that allow him to infer additional
attribute values about each profile from his observations.
We next define the publicly observations based on which the adversary learns
additional information about each profile.
Definition 6 (Publication Function). A publication function G is a randomized
function that maps each profile model θP to a restricted profile model G(θP ) =
θA
′
P such that there is at least one attribute α ∈ A′ with θP (α) = G(θP )(α).
The publication function G reflects which attributes are disseminated pub-
licly by the user through his profile P . G can, in particular, also include local
sanitization where some attribute values are perturbed. However, we do require
that at least one attribute value remains correct to capture utility requirements
faced in open settings.
A public observation now is the collection of all restricted profile models
generated by a publication function.
Definition 7 (Public Observation). Let P be the set of all profiles, and let G
be a publication function. The public observation O is the set of all restricted
profile models generated by G, i.e., O = {G(θP )|P ∈ P}.
The public observation O essentially captures all publicly disseminated at-
tribute values that can be observed by the adversary. Given such an observation
O, we can now determine what the adversary Adv learns about each profile by
determining his a-posteriori belief.
Definition 8 (A-Posteriori Belief). Let P be the set of all profiles. Given an
adversary Adv = (b, κ) and a public observation O, the adversary’s a-posteriori
belief b = {bP ∈ DA|P ∈ P} is determined by applying the Bayesian inference
rule, i.e.,
bP [θ|O, κ] = Pr[O|κ, θ] · bP [θ]∑
θ′ Pr[O|κ, θ′] · bP [θ′]
.
Here, the conditional probability Pr[O|κ, θ] describes the likelihood that the
observational O is created by the specific entity model θ.
We will utilize the a-posteriori belief of the adversary to reason about the
violation of the user specified privacy requirements in Section 4.4.
4.3 Inapplicability of Statistical Privacy Notions
In the following, we formally show that traditional non-disclosure guarantees,
e.g., in the style of Differential Privacy, are not possible in open settings.
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Kasiviswanathan and Smith [17] provide a general definition of non-disclosure
they call -privacy. In their definition, they compare the adversary Adv’s a-
posteriori beliefs after observing the transcript t generated from a database
sanitazitaion mechanism F applied on two adjacent databases with n rows: first
on the database x, leading to the belief b0[.|t], and secondly on the database
x−i, where a value in the ith row in x is replaced by a default value, leading to
the belief bi[.|t].
Definition 9 (-semantic Privacy [17]). Let  ∈ [0, 1]. A randomized algorithm
F is -semantically private if for all belief distributions b on Dn, for all possible
transcripts, and for all i = 1 . . . n:
SD(b0[.|t], bi[.|t]) ≤ .
Here, SD is the total variation distance of two probability distributions.
Definition 10. Let X and Y be two probability distributions over the sample
space D. The total variation distance SD of X and Y is
SD(X,Y ) = maxS⊂D [Pr[X ∈ S]− Pr[Y ∈ S]] .
Kasiviswanathan and Smith [17] show that -differential privacy is essentially
equivalent to -semantic privacy.
In our formalization of privacy in open settings, varying a single database
entry corresponds to changing the value of a single attribute α in the profile
model θP of a profile P to a default value. We denote this modified entity
model with θαP , and the thereby produced a-posteriori belief by b
α
P . A profile P
would then be -semantically private if for any modified profile model θαP , the
a-posteriori belief of adversary Adv does not change by more than .
Definition 11 (-semantic Privacy in Open Settings). Let  ∈ [0, 1]. A profile
P is -semantically private in open settings if for any attribute α,
SD(bP [.|O], bαP [.|O]) ≤ 
where bP and b
α
P are the a-posteriori beliefs of the adversary after observing the
public output of θP and θ
α
P respectively.
As expected, we can show that -semantic privacy can only hold for  = 1
in open settings.
Theorem 1. For any profile model θP and any attribute α, there is an adversary
Adv such that
SD(b[.|O], bα[.|O]) ≥ 1.
Proof. Let Adv have a uniform prior belief, i.e., all possible profile models have
the same probability, and empty world knowledge κ. Let α be the one attribute
that remains the same after applying the publication function G. Let x be the
original value of this attribute α and let x∗ be the default value that replaces x.
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Observing the restricted profile model θP [A′] without any additional world
knowledge will lead to an a-posteriori belief, where the probability of the entity
model θ with θ[A′] = θP [A′] and NULL everywhere else, is set to 1.
Conversely, the modified setting will result in an a-posteriori belief that sets
the probability for the entity model θ∗ to one, where θ∗ is constructed for the
modified setting as θ above. Thus b[θ|O] = 1, whereas bα[θ|O] = 0, and hence
SD(b[.|O], bα[.|O]) = 1.
Intuitively, the adversary can easily distinguish differing profile models be-
cause a) he can directly observe the profiles publicly available information, b)
he chooses which attributes he considers for his inference and c) only restricted,
local sanitization is available to the profile. Since these are elementary proper-
ties of privacy in open settings, we can conclude that hard security guarantees
in the style of differential privacy are impossible to achieve in open settings.
However, we can provide an assessment of the disclosure risks by explicitly
fixing the a-priori knowledge and the attribute set considered by the adversary.
While we no longer all-quantify over all possible adversaries, and therefore lose
the full generality of traditional non-disclosure guarantees, we might still provide
meaningful privacy assessments in practice. We further discuss this approach in
Section 4.5, and follow this approach in our instantiation of the general model
for assessing the likelihood of identity disclosure in Section 5.
4.4 User-Specified Privacy Requirements
In the following we introduce user-specified privacy requirements that allow us
to formulate privacy goals that are user- and context-dependent. These can then
lead to restricted privacy assessments instead of general privacy guarantees that
we have shown to be impossible in open setting in the previous section.
We define a user’s privacy requirements on a per-profile basis, stating which
attribute values should not be inferred by adversary after seeing a public obser-
vations O.
Definition 12 (Privacy Policy). A privacy policy R is a set of privacy require-
ments r = (P, {αi = xi}) which require that profile P should never expose the
attribute values xi for the attributes αi ∈ A.
By setting privacy requirements in a per-profile basis we capture an im-
portant property of information dissemination in open settings: users utilize
different profiles for different context (e.g., different online services) assuming
these profiles remain separate and specific information is only disseminated un-
der specific circumstances.
Given the definition of privacy policies, we now define the violation of a policy
by considering the adversary’s a-posterior belief b, as introduced in Section 4.2.
Definition 13 (Privacy Policy Satisfaction / Violation). Let Adv = (b, κ) be
an adversary with a-posteriori belief b, and let θ[α = x] be the set of all entity
models that have the value x for the attribute α. A profile Pui σ-satisfies a user’s
privacy requirement ruj = (P, {αi = xi}), written Pui |=σ ruj , if
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• P = Pui
• ∀αi :
∑
θ∈θ[αi=xi] bP [θ|O, κ] ≤ σ
and σ-violates the user’s privacy requirement otherwise.
A user model θu σ-satisfies a user u’s privacy policy Ru, written θu |=σ Ru,
if all profile models θPui σ-satisfy their corresponding privacy requirements, and
σ-violates the privacy policy otherwise.
The above attributes can also take the form of “P belongs to the same user
as P ′”, effectively restricting which profiles should be linked to each other. We
will investigate this profile linkability problem specifically in Section 5.
4.5 Sensitive Information
In contrast to the closed-world setting, with its predefined set of sensitive at-
tributes that automatically defines the privacy requirements, a suitable def-
inition of information sensitivity in the open setting is still missing. In the
following, we derive the notion of sensitive information from the user privacy
requirements we defined in Section 4.4.
Definition 14 (Sensitive Attributes). A set of attributes A∗ is sensitive for
a user u in the context of her profile Pui if u’s privacy policy Ru contains a
privacy requirement r = (Pui ,A′ = X) where A∗ ⊆ A′.
Here, we use the notation A = X as vector representation for ∀αi ∈ A :
αi = xi.
Sensitive attributes, as defined above, are not the only type of attributes
that are worth to protect: In practice, an adversary can additionally infer sensi-
tive attributes from other attributes through statistical inference using a-priori
knowledge. We call such attributes that allow for the inference of sensitive
attributes critical attributes.
Definition 15 (Critical Attributes). Given a set of attributes A∗, let P be a
profile with dom(θP ) ⊇ A, and let P ′ be the profile with the restricted profile
model θP ′ = θ
A′
P , where A′ = dom(θP ) \ A∗.
The set of attributes A∗ is σ-critical for the user u that owns the profile
P and an adversary with prior belief bP and world knowledge κ, if u’s privacy
policy Ru contains a privacy requirement r such that P σ-violates r but P ′ does
not.
Critical information require the same amount of protection as sensitive infor-
mation, the difference however being that critical information is only protected
for the sake of protecting sensitive information.
As a direct consequence of the definition above, sensitive attributes are also
critical.
Corollary 1. Let A be a set of sensitive attributes. Then A is also 0-critical.
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Another consequence we can draw is that privacy requirements will always
be satisfied if no critical attributes are disseminated.
Corollary 2. Let O be a public observations that does not include any critical
attributes for a user u and an adversary Adv. Then u’s privacy policy Ru is
σ-satisfied against Adv.
The corollary above implies that, while we cannot provide general non-
disclosure guarantees in open settings, we can provide privacy assessments for
specific privacy requirements, given an accurate estimate of the adversary’s prior
beliefs.
While privacy assessments alone are not satisfactory from a computer security
perspective, where we usually require hard security guarantees quantified over
all possible adversaries, the fact remains that we are faced with privacy issues
in open settings that are to this day unanswered for due to the impossibility
of hard guarantees in such settings. Pragmatically thinking, we are convinced
that we should move from impossible hard guarantees to more practical privacy
assessments instead. This makes particularly sense in settings where users are
not victims of targeted attacks, but instead fear attribute disclosure to data-
collecting third parties.
5 Linkability in Open Settings
In the following we instantiate the general privacy model introduced in the last
section to reason about the likelihood that two profiles of the same user are
linked by the adversary in open settings. We introduce the novel notion of
(k, d)-anonymity with which we assess anonymity and linkability based on the
similarity of profiles within an online community.
To simplify the notation we introduce in this section, we will, in the following,
talk about matching entities  and ′ the adversary wants to link, instead of
profiles P1 and P2 that belong to the same user u. All definitions introduced in
the general framework above naturally carry over to entities as well.
5.1 Model Instantiation for Linkability
In the linkability problem, we are interested in assessing the likelihood that two
matching entities  and ′ can be linked, potentially across different online plat-
forms. The corresponding privacy requirements, as introduced in Section 4.4,
are r1 = (, αL) and r2 = (
′, αL), where αL is the attribute that  and ′ belong
to the same user. Consequently, we say that these entities are unlinkable if they
satisfy the aforementioned privacy requirements.
Definition 16 (Unlinkability). Two entities  and ′ are σ-unlinkable if
{θ, θ′} |=σ {r1, r2}.
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5.2 Anonymity
To assess the identity disclosure risk of an entity  within a collection of entities
E , we use the following intuition:  is anonymous in E if there is a subset E ′ ⊆ E
to which  is very similar. The collection E ’ then is an anonymous subset of E
for .
To assess the similarity of entities within a collection of entities, we will use
a distance measure dist on the entity models of these entities. We will require
that this measure provides all properties of a metric.
A collection of entities in which the distance of all entities to  is small (i.e.,
≤ a constant d) is called d-convergent for .
Definition 17. A collection of entities E is d-convergent for  if dist(θ, θ′) ≤ d
for all ′ ∈ E.
Convergence measures the similarity of a collection of individuals. Anonymity
is achieved if an entity can find a collection of entities that are all similar to
this entity. This leads us to the definition of (k, d)-anonymity, which requires a
subset of similar entities of size k.
Definition 18. An entity  is (k, d)-anonymous in a collection of entities E
if there exists a subset of entities E ′ ⊆ E with the properties that  ∈ E, that
|E ′| ≥ k and that E ′ is d-convergent.
An important feature of this anonymity definition is that it provides anonymity
guarantees that can be derived from a subset of all available data, but continue
to hold once we consider a larger part of the dataset.
Corollary 3. If an entity is (k, d)-anonymous in a collection of entities E, then
it is also (k, d)-anonymous in the collection of entities E ′ ⊃ E.
Intuitively, (k, d)-anonymity is a generalization of the classical notions of k-
anonymity to open settings without pre-defined quasi-identifiers. We schemati-
cally illustrate such anonymous subsets in Figure 1.
5.3 Entity Matching
We define the notion of matching identities. As before, we use the distance
measure dist to assess the similarity of two entities.
Definition 19. An entity  c-matches an entity ′ if dist(θ, θ′) ≤ c.
Similarly, we can also define the notion of one entity matching a collection
of entities.
Definition 20. A collection of entities E c-matches an entity ′ if all entities
 ∈ E c-match ′.
Assuming the adversary only has access to the similarity of entities, the
best he can do is comparing the distance of all entities  ∈ E to ′ and make a
probabilistic choice proportional to their relative distance values.
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Figure 1: Anonymity in crowdsourcing systems.
Now, if the matching identity ∗ is d-convergent in E the, all entities in E
will have a comparatively similar distance to ′.
Lemma 1. Let E be d-convergent for ∗. If ∗ c-matches ′, then E (c + d)-
matches ′.
Proof. Since E is d-convergent for ∗, ∀′ ∈ E : dist(∗, ′) ≤ d. Using the
triangle inequality, and the fact that ∗ c-matches the entity ′, we can bound
the distance of all entities  ∈ E to ′ by ∀′′ ∈ E : dist(, ′) ≤ c + d. Hence E
(c+ d)-matches the entity ′.
Hence, the matching entity ∗ does not c-match ′ for a small value of c,
the adversary Adv he will have a number of possibly matching entities that are
similarly likely to match ′.
We get the same result if not the whole collection E is convergent, but if
there exists a subset of convergent entities that allows the target to remain
anonymous.
Corollary 4. Let ’ be (k, d)-anonymous in E. If ’ c-matches an entity  then
there is a subset E ′ ⊆ E of size at least k which (c+ d)-matches .
5.4 Identity Disclosure
We assume that the adversary uses the similarity of the candidate entities to his
target entity ′ to make his decision. The likelihood that the adversary chooses
a specific entity ∗ then is the relative magnitude of dist(∗, ), i.e.
Pr[Adv chooses ∗] = 1− dist(
∗, ′)∑
∈E dist(, ′)
.
We can now bound the likelihood with which a specific entity ∗ would be chosen
by the adversary if ∗ is (k, d)-anonymous.
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Theorem 2. Let the matching entity ∗ of the entity ′ in the collection E =
{1, . . . , n} be (k, d)-anonymous in E. Furthermore let ∗ c-match ′. Then
an adversary Adv = (b, ∅) with uniform prior belief b and with empty world
knowledge that only observes the similarity of entities links the entity ∗ to ′
with a likelihood of at most t ≤ 1− cc+(k−1)(c+d) .
Proof. Let E∗ be the (k, d) anonymous subset of ∗ in E . Let t∗ be the likelihood
of identifying ∗ from E∗. Then clearly t < t∗ since we remove all possible, but
wrong candidates in E \ E∗.
Since ∗ c-matches ′, by Lemma 1, we can upper bound the distance of each
entity in E∗ to ′, i.e.,
∀ ∈ E∗ : dist(, ′) ≤ c+ d
We can now bound t∗ as follows:
t∗ = Pr[Adv chooses ]
= 1− c
c+ (k − 1)( ∑
∈E∗\{∗}
dist(, ′))
≤ 1− c
c+ (k − 1)(c+ d)
Theorem 2 shows that, as long as entities remain anonymous in a suitably
large anonymous subset of a collection of entities, an adversary will have dif-
ficulty identifying them with high likelihood. Recalling our unlinkability def-
inition from the beginning of the section, this result also implies that ∗ is
σ-unlinkable for σ = t.
Corollary 5. Let the matching entity ∗ of the entity ′ in the collection E =
{1, . . . , n} be (k, d)-anonymous in E. Then ∗ and ′ are σ-unlinkable for
σ = 1− cc+(k−1)(c+d) against an adversary Adv = (b, ∅) with uniform prior belief
and empty world knowledge that only observes entity similarity.
In Section 6.5 we present experiments that evaluate the anonymity and link-
ability of individuals in the Online Social Network Reddit, and measure how
well they can be identified from among their peers.
5.5 Limitations
The quality of the assessment provided by the d-convergence model largely de-
pends on adversarial prior belief we assume: in our results above, we assume
an adversary without any prior knowledge. In practice, however, the adversary
might have access to prior beliefs that can help him in his decision making.
Therefore, turning such assessments into meaningful estimates in practice re-
quires a careful estimation of prior knowledge by, e.g., producing a more accurate
profile model: the problem of comprehensive profile building for entities in an
open setting is an open question that has been examined somewhat in the lit-
erature [5, 9, 8, 28, 4], but on the whole still leaves a lot of space for future work.
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This concludes the formal definitions of our d-convergence model. In the next
sections, we instantiate it for identity disclosure risk analyses based on user-
generated text-content and apply this instantiation to the OSN Reddit.
6 Linkability Evaluation on Reddit
While the main focus of this paper is to present the actual privacy model as such,
the following experiments are meant to provide first insights into the application
of our framework, without taking overly complex adversarial capabilities into
account. The evaluation can easily be extended to a more refined model of an
adversary without conceptual difficulties.
We first articulate the goals of this evaluation, and then, secondly, describe
the data collection process, followed by defining the instantiation of the general
framework we use for our evaluation in the third step. Fourth, we introduce the
necessary processing steps on our dataset, before we finally discuss the results
of our evaluation.
6.1 Goals
In our evaluation, we aim at validating our model by conducting two basic
experiments. First, we want to empirically show that, our model instantiation
yields a suitable abstraction of real users for reasoning about their privacy. To
this end, profiles of the same user should be more similar to each other (less
distant) than profiles from different users.
Second, we want to empirically show that a larger anonymous subset makes
it more difficult for an adversary to correctly link the profile. Thereby, we
inspect whether anonymous subsets provide a practical estimate of a profile’s
anonymity.
Given profiles with anonymous subsets of similar size, we determine the per-
centage of profiles which the adversary can match within the top k results, i.e.,
given a source profile, the adversary computes the top k most similar (less dis-
tant) profiles in the other subreddit. We denote this percentage by precision@k
and correlate it to the size of the anonymous subsets.
We fix the convergence of the anonymous subsets to be equal to the matching
distance between two corresponding profiles. Our intuition is that, this way, the
anonymous subset captures most of the profiles an adversary could potentially
consider matching.
6.2 Data-Collection
For the empirical evaluation of our privacy model, we use the online social
network Reddit [1] that was founded in 2005 and constitutes one of the largest
discussion and information sharing platforms in use today. On Reddit, users
share and discuss topics in a vast array of topical subreddits that collect all
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topics belonging to one general area; e.g. there are subreddits for world news,
tv series, sports, food, gaming and many others. Each subreddit contains so-
called submissions, i.e., user-generated content that can be commented on by
other users.
To have a ground truth for our evaluation, we require profiles of the same
user same user across different OSNs to be linked. Fortunately, Reddit’s struc-
ture provides an inherent mechanism to deal with this requirement. Instead of
considering Reddit as a single OSN, we treat each subreddit as its own OSN.
Since users are identified through the same pseudonym in all of those subred-
dits, they remain linkable across the subreddits’ boundaries. Hence our analysis
has the required ground truth. The adversary we simulate, however, is only
provided with the information available in the context of each subreddit and
thus can only try to match profiles across subreddits. Ground truth in the end
allows us to verify the correctness of his match.
To build up our dataset, we built a crawler using Reddit’s API to collect com-
ments. Recall that subreddits contain submissions that, in turn, are commented
by the users. For our crawler, we focused on the large amount of comments be-
cause they contain a lot of text and thus are best suitable for computing the
unigram models.
Our crawler operates in two steps that are repeatedly executed over time.
During the whole crawling process, it maintains a list of already processed users.
In the first step, our crawler collects a list of the overall newest comments on
Reddit from Reddit’s API and inserts these comments into our dataset. In the
second step, for each author of these comments who has not been processed yet,
the crawler also collects and inserts her latest 1, 000 comments into our dataset.
Then, it updates the list of processed users. The number of 1, 000 comments
per user, is a restriction of Reddit’s API.
In total, during the whole September 2014, we collected more than 40 million
comments from over 44, 000 subreddits. The comments were written by about
81, 000 different users which results in more than 2.75 million different profiles.
The whole dataset is stored in an anonymized form in a MySQL database
and is available upon request.
6.3 Model Instantiation
On Reddit, users only interact with each other by by posting comments to text
of link submissions. Reddit therefore does not allow us to exploit features found
in other social networks, such as friend links or other static data about each
user. On the other hand, this provides us with the opportunity to evaluate
the linkability model introduced in Section 5 based dynamic, user-generated
content, in this case user-generated text content.
Since we only consider text content, we instantiate the general model from
the previous sections with an unigram model, where each attribute is a word
unigram, an its value is the frequency with which the unigram appears in the
profiles comments. Such unigram models have succesfully been used in the past
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to characterize the information within text content and to correlate users across
different online platforms [15, 23].
Definition 21 (Unigram Model). Let V be a finite vocabulary. The unigram
model θP = pi of a profile is a set of frequencies pi ∈ [0, . . . , 1] with which each
unigram wi ∈ V appears in the profile P . Each frequency pi is determined by
pi =
count(wi, P )∑
w∈V count(w,P )
Since the unigram model essentially constitutes a probability distribution,
we instantiate our distance metric dist with the Jensen-Shannon divergence [14].
The Jensen-Shannon divergence is a symmetric extension of the Kullback-Leiber
divergence has been shown to be successful in many related information retrieval
scenarios.
Definition 22. Let P and Q be two statistical models over a discrete space Ω.
The Jensen-Shannon divergence is defined by
DJS =
1
2
DKL(P ||M) + 1
2
DKL(Q||M)
where DKL is the Kullback-Leibler divergence
DKL(P ||Q) =
∑
ω∈Ω
log
(
P (ω)
Q(ω)
)
P (ω)
and M is the averaged distribution M = 12 (P +Q).
In the following, we will use the square-root of the Jensen-Shannon diver-
gence, constituting a metric, as our distance measure, i.e., dist =
√
DJS.
6.4 Data-Processing
The evaluation on our dataset is divided into sequentially performed computa-
tion steps, which include the normalization of all comments, the computation
of unigram models for each profile, a filtering of our dataset to keep the eval-
uation tractable, the computation of profile distances and the computation of
(k, d)-anonymous subsets.
Normalizing Comments. Unstructured, heterogeneous data, as in our case,
may contain a variety of valuable information about a user’s behavior, e.g.,
including formatting and punctuation. Although we could transform these into
attributes, we do not consider them here for the sake of simplicity.
In order to get a clean representation to apply the unigram model on, we
apply various normalization steps, including transformation to lower case, the
removal of Reddit formatting and punctuation except for smilies. Moreover,
we apply a encoding specific normalization, replace URLs by their hostnames
and shorten repeated characters in words like cooool to a maximum of three.
22
Finally, we also filter out a list of 597 stopwords from the comments. Therefore,
we perform six different preprocessing steps on the data, which we describe in
more detail in the following.
1. Convert to lower case letters: In our statistical language models, we do
not want to differentiate between capitalized and lowercased occurrences
of words. Therefore, we convert the whole comment into lower case.
2. Remove Reddit formatting: Reddit allows users to use a wide range of
formatting modifiers that we divide into two basic categories: formatting
modifiers that influence the typography and the layout of the comment,
and formatting modifiers that include external resources into a comment.
The first kind of modifier, named layout modifiers, is stripped off the
comment, while leaving the plain text. The second kind of modifier, called
embedding modifiers, is removed from the comment completely.
One example for a layout modifier is the asterisk: When placing an as-
terisk both in front and behind some text, e.g., *text*, this text will be
displayed in italics, e.g., text . Our implementation removes these en-
closing asterisks, because they are not valuable for computing statistical
language models for n-grams and only affect the layout. Similarly, we also
remove other layout modifiers such as table layouts, list layouts and URL
formatting in a way that only the important information remains.
A simple example for embedding modifiers are inline code blocks: Users
can embed arbitrary code snippets into their comments using the ‘ mod-
ifier. Since these code blocks do not belong to the natural language part
of the comment and only embed a kind of external resource, we remove
them completely. In addition to code blocks, the category of embedding
modifiers also includes quotes of other comments.
3. Remove stacked diacritics: In our dataset, we have seen that diacritics
are often misused. Since Reddit uses Unicode as its character encoding,
users can create their own characters by arbitrarily stacking diacritics on
top of them. To avoid this kind of unwanted characters, we first normalize
the comment by utilizing the unicode character composition, which tries to
combine each letter and its diacritics into a single precombined character.
Secondly, we remove all remaining diacritic symbols from the comment.
While this process preserves most of the normal use of diacritics, it is able
to remove all unwanted diacritics.
4. Replace URLs by their hostname: Generally, a URL is very specific
and a user often does not include the exact same URL in different com-
ments. However, it is much more common that a user includes different
URLs that all belong to the same hostname, e.g., www.mypage.com. Since
our statistical language models should represent the expected behavior of
a user in terms of used words (including URLs), we restrict all URLs to
their hostnames.
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Top Reddit subreddit: Lost subreddit: TipOfMyTongue
Unigram Frequency Unigram Frequency Unigram Frequency
1. people 4,127,820 island 832 www.youtube.com 3663
2. time 2,814,841 show 750 song 1,542
3. good 2,710,665 lost 653 remember 1,261
4. gt 2,444,240 time 580 en.wikipedia.org 1,100
5. game 1,958,850 people 527 sounds 1,007
6. pretty 1,422,640 locke 494 solved 924
7. 2 1,413,118 season 431 movie 918
8. lot 1,385,167 jacob 429 find 829
9. work 1,352,292 mib 372 :) 786
10. 1 1,184,029 jack 310 game 725
11. 3 1,124,503 episode 280 time 678
12. great 1,070,299 ben 255 thinking 633
13. point 1,063,239 good 250 good 633
14. play 1,060,985 monster 237 www.imdb.com 584
15. years 1,032,270 lot 220 video 583
16. bad 1,008,607 gt 182 pretty 570
17. day 989,180 character 165 youtu.be 569
18. love 988,567 walt 163 mark 548
19. find 987,171 man 162 edit 540
20. shit 976,928 dharma 162 post 519
Table 1: Top 20 unigrams of Reddit and two sample subreddits Lost and
TipOfMyTongue.
5. Remove punctuation: Most of the punctuation belongs to the sentence
structure and, thus, should not a part of our statistical language models.
Therefore, we remove all punctuation except for the punctuation inside
URLs and smilies. We do not remove the smilies, because people are
using them in a similar role as words to enrich their sentences: Every
person has her own subset of smilies that she typically uses. To keep the
smilies in the comment, we maintain a list of 153 different smilies that will
not be removed from the comment.
6. Remove duplicated characters: In the internet, people often dupli-
cate characters in a word to add emotional nuances to their writing, e.g.,
cooooooooool. But sometimes the number of reduplicated characters
varies, even if the same emotion should be expressed. Thus, we reduce
the number of duplicated characters to a maximum of 3, e.g., coool. In
practice, this truncation allows us to differentiate between the standard
use of a word and the emotional variation of it, while it does not depend
on the actual number of duplicated characters.
Computing Unigram Models. From the normalized data, we compute
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the unigram frequencies for each comment. Recall that our dataset consists
of many subreddits that each form their own OSN. Thus, we aggregate the
corresponding unigram frequencies per profile, per subreddit, and for Reddit as
a whole. Using this data, we compute the word unigram frequencies for each
comment as described in Section 6.3.
Since a subreddit collects submissions and comments to a single topic, we
expect the unigrams to reflect its topic specific language. Indeed, the 20 most
frequently used unigrams of a subreddit demonstrate that the language adapts to
the topic. As an example, we show the top 20 unigrams (excluding stopwords)
of Reddit and two sample subreddits Lost and TipOfMyTongue in Table 1.
As expected, there are subreddit specific unigrams that occur more often in
the context of one subreddit than in the context of any other subreddit. For
example, the subreddit Lost deals with a TV series that is about the survivors
of a plane crash and its aftermath on an island. Unsurprisingly, the word island
is the top unigram in this subreddit. In contrast, the subreddit TipOfMyTongue
deals with the failure to remember a word from memory and, thus, has the word
remember in the list of its top three unigrams.
Filtering the Dataset. To reduce the required amount of computations we
restrict ourselves to interesting profiles. We define an interesting profile as one
that contains at least 100 comments and that belongs to a subreddit with at
least 100 profiles. Additionally, we dropped the three largest subreddits from
our dataset to speed up the computation.
In conclusion, this filtering results in 58, 091 different profiles that belong to
37, 935 different users in 1, 930 different subreddits.
Distances Within and Across Subreddits. Next, we compute the pairwise
distance within and across subreddits using our model instantiation. Excluding
the distance of profiles to themselves, the minimal, maximal and average dis-
tance of two profiles within subreddits in our dataset are approximately 0.12,
1 and 0.79 respectively. Across subreddits, the minimal, maximal and average
distance of two profiles are approximately 0.1, 1 and 0.85 respectively.
Anonymous Subsets. Utilizing the distances within subreddits, we can de-
termine the anonymous subsets for each profile in a subreddit. More precisely,
we compute the anonymous subset for each pair of profiles from the same user.
We set the convergence d to the matching distance between both profiles and
determine the size of the resulting anonymous subset.
6.5 Evaluation and Discussion
In this subsection, we inspect and interpret the results of our experiments with
regard to our aforementioned goals. Therefore, we first start by giving evi-
dence that our approach indeed provides a suitable abstraction of real users for
reasoning about their privacy.
To this end, we compare the distance of matching profiles to the average
distance of non-matching profiles. In particular, for each pair of profiles from
the same user in subreddits s and s′, we plot the average distance from the
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Figure 2: The average distance between a profile in subreddit s and all profiles
in s′ versus the matching distance between the profile and its correspondence
in s′.
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Figure 3: The anonymous subset size correlated to the precision an adversary
has if considering the top 5 profiles as matching.
profile in s to the non-matching profiles in s′ in relation to the distance to the
matching profile in s′ in Figure 2. The red line denotes the function y = x
and divides the figure into two parts: if a point lies below the line through the
origin, the corresponding profiles match better than the average of the remaining
profiles. Since the vast majority of datapoints is located below the line, we can
conclude that profiles of the same user match better than profiles of different
users.
Our second goal aimed at showing that anonymous subsets indeed can be
used to reason about the users’ privacy. Therefore, we investigate the chances
of an adversary to find a profile of the same user within the top k matches and
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relate its chance to the size of the profile’s anonymous subset. More precisely,
given multiple target profiles with similar anonymous subset sizes, we determine
the, so called, precision@k, i.e., the ratio of target profiles that occur in the top
k ranked matches (by ascending distance from the source profiles). We relate
this precision@k to the anonymous subset sizes with a convergence d set to the
distance between the source and target profiles, and we group the anonymous
subset sizes in bins of size 10.
In our evaluation, we considered k ∈ {1, 5, 10, 20}, which all yield very similar
results. Exemplarily, we correlate the aforementioned measures for k = 5 in
Figure 3, clearly showing that an increasing anonymous subset size correlates
with an increasing uncertainty – i.e., decreasing precision – for the adversary.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We presented a user-centric privacy framework for reasoning about privacy in
open web settings. In our formalization, we address the essential challenges
of privacy in open settings: we defined a comprehensive data model that can
deal with the unstructured dissemination of heterogeneous information, and we
derived the sensitivity of information from user-specified and context-sensitive
privacy requirements. We showed that, in this formalization of privacy in open
settings, hard security guarantees in the sense of Differential Privacy are impos-
sible to achieve. We then instantiated the general framework to reason about
the identity disclosure problem. The technical core of our identity disclosure
model is the new notion of (k, d)-anonymity that assesses the anonymity of en-
tities based on their similarity to other entities within the same community. We
applied this instantiation to a dataset of 15 million user-generated text entries
collected from the Online Social Network Reddit and showed that our framework
is suited for the assessment of linkablity threats in Online Social Networks.
As far as future work is concerned, many directions are highly promising.
First, our general framework only provides a static view on privacy in open
settings. Information dissemination on the Internet, however, is, in particular,
characterized by its highly dynamic nature. Extending the model presented
in this paper with a suitable transition system to capture user actions might
lead to powerful system for monitoring privacy risks in dynamically changing,
open settings. Second, information presented in Online Social Networks is often
highly time-sensitive, e.g., shared information is often only valid for a certain
period of time, and personal facts can change over time. Explicitly including
timing information in our entity model will hence further increase the accu-
racy of the entity models derived from empirical evidence. Finally, our privacy
model is well-suited for the evaluation of protection mechanisms for very spe-
cific privacy requirements, and new such mechanisms with provable guarantees
against restricted adversaries can be developed. On the long run, we pursue
the vision of providing the formal foundations for comprehensive, trustworthy
privacy assessments and, ultimately, for developing user-friendly privacy assess-
ment tools.
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